Procreate and cherish: A note on Australia’s abrupt shift to Pro-Natalism by Jackson, Natalie & Casey, Amina
 
New Zealand Population Review, 35:129-148. 
Copyright © 2009 Population Association of New Zealand  
 
 
Procreate and Cherish: A Note on Australia’s 
Abrupt Shift to Pro-Natalism 
 
 
NATALIE JACKSON *  
AMINA CASEY ** 
 
 
Abstract 
After a long history of arguing that Australian governments do not 
intervene in the bedrooms of the nation, in 2004 the Howard Government 
did exactly that. Under the enthusiastic choreographing of then Treasurer 
Peter Costello, it implemented an explicit and indirect fertility policy in 
the form of a maternity payment, commonly known as the ‘Baby Bonus’. 
Rising fertility in Australia since that time has been widely claimed as 
evidence of the policy’s success. Hailed as a mini ‘baby boom’, Costello was 
moved to describe the policy as a shift from ‘population or perish’ to 
‘procreate and cherish’. Despite arguing against it while in Opposition, the 
policy has been continued with only a few changes by the incumbent Rudd 
Government, seemingly on the grounds that it may indeed be responsible 
for the recent ‘nudging up’ of birth rates.  
 
This paper traces the policy shift and concludes with a brief analysis of 
Australian trends across the period of the Baby Bonus (2004-2008), 
showing that one quarter of the increase in numbers is due to cohort size, 
but noting that fertility has also risen in many developed countries across 
the same period and thus trends in Australia may just be part of a broader 
trend – and/or in part an artifact of the index used to measure fertility. It 
also draws attention to the collateral effect of an increased dependency 
ratio, with the mini ‘boom’ reaching school age at the very moment the 
post war baby boomers reach retirement age – as forewarned by Costello 
in 2002 when initially rejecting the idea of a Baby Bonus. 
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Introduction 
Over the last 30-40 years fertility rates have fallen in all advanced 
industrial societies and none of them has had success at a major 
turnaround. Boosting fertility rates actually reduces the proportion of the 
population of working age at least for a generation. It increases the 
dependant to worker ratio with a higher number of children. It has a 
negative effect for around 30 years before you get the pay off. Boosting 
fertility rates may [also] well reduce [female] participation rates. 
Australian Federal Treasurer Peter Costello, Luncheon address to Australian 
Financial Review Leaders, Sydney following the 2002-03 Budget. 
You should have one for the father, one for the mother and one for the 
country. If you want to fix the ageing demographic, that's what you do. 
Federal Treasurer Peter Costello, televised comments following the 2004 Federal 
Budget’s announcement of the maternity allowance. 
 
n May 2004, acknowledging concerns about population ageing and the 
inability of immigration to dramatically reduce it, the Australian 
Government introduced the now widely known ‘Baby Bonus’ 
(maternity payment). At its Budget night launch, the then Treasurer Peter 
Costello urged Australians of reproductive age to have “one for the father, 
one for the mother, and one for the country” (Costello 2004). Such an 
explicit exhortation to do one’s patriotic duty by having children had not 
been seen in Australia for a century (McKinnon 2000; Rottier 2005); indeed 
it was in complete opposition to Australia’s long cherished resistance to 
anything resembling governmental intervention in the bedrooms of the 
nation (Cocks 1998; Caldwell, Caldwell and McDonald 2002: 11; Australian 
Government 2004: 19a).  
 Since major policy shifts are important to record, this note outlines the 
journey, beginning with the Government’s development in 1999 of The 
National Strategy for an Ageing Australia (Department of Aged Care 1999a-c; 
Department of Health and Aged Care 2002). We also refer to the handful of 
background papers and statements by a small number of academics, policy 
advisors and government agencies which can be identified as instrumental in 
guiding and consolidating government interest in the issue of population 
ageing over the 1990s and early 2000s.1 We acknowledge that the reference 
here to an ‘abrupt shift’ is located in a much broader historical context, one 
that involves important political and theoretical nuances (Heard 2006), but 
I
Procreate and Cherish 131  
 
 
we argue that the Australian Government’s dramatic ‘about face’ appears to 
have involved a re-evaluation of the view that low fertility itself was a factor 
previously constraining the hand of government.2 In other words, we argue 
that the Howard Government perceived the ‘threat’ of structural ageing as 
greater than the risk of losing voters – and sold it to the public by 
marketing it in a friendly, jocular manner.   
 The National Strategy for an Ageing Australia was first released in 1999 as 
a series of three discussion papers by the then-Minister Bronwyn Bishop, 
under the carriage of the Commonwealth Department of Aged Care.3 The 
final version was released in February 2002 under the carriage of the 
Department’s new Minister Kevin Andrews.4 Of significant import is that in 
neither case was the focus on low fertility or the possible related needs of 
families and women, but rather, on the impact of population ageing on the 
labour force, Australia’s retirement system, and the ageing process of 
individuals, writ large. Indeed, in the final strategy there are only two brief 
mentions of the word ‘fertility’ (pages 5 and 16), while acknowledgement of 
the distinction between structural and numerical ageing which had appeared 
in the initial discussion papers (e.g. Department of Aged Care 1999a: 51) is 
missing. Instead, in the forward to the final report, Minister Kevin Andrews 
states: “As the Minister for Ageing, I intend to celebrate the contribution of 
older Australians, while also recognising that older people deserve to be 
supported across all areas of their lives” (Department of Health and Aged 
Care 2002: vii). His sentiments are echoed in the accompanying statement 
by the Prime Minister and the Executive Summary, both of which 
concentrate on the health, ageing, workforce and retirement issues of ‘senior 
Australians’. 
 The invisibility of the role of low fertility in driving structural 
population ageing and indeed of any clear distinction between structural and 
numerical ageing in the final release of the National Strategy is of import to 
this story. Population ageing was popularly perceived of as a growing 
increase in the numbers of elderly, and the document would have done little 
to alter this perception. At the same time, in the lead-up to the 2001 
election, the issue of balancing work and family life had become a key 
platform of the Coalition party’s election strategy, yet most pronouncements 
show that at this stage interest in the family was ostensibly unrelated to 
population ageing. Faced with a number of significant challenges relating to 
(among other things) its handling of the ‘Tampa crisis’, when a foreign ship 
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carrying asylum seekers whose boat had sunk was refused entry to 
Australian waters, the Coalition focussed its election campaign on the 
combined need for ‘stronger families and stronger communities’ and ‘border 
protection’ (Rottier 2005: 143). The manner in which these two platforms 
came together has been argued by several to have ideological and racist 
undertones, but that is tangential to the present issue.5   
 At the centre of the Coalition’s 2001 Stronger families, Stronger 
communities election campaign was the ‘First Child Tax Refund’, an incentive 
that would enable first time mothers to claim back some of the tax paid on 
their income earned in the year prior to the birth of their child.6 The refund 
would be available on an annual basis across a five year period, provided that 
the woman did not re-enter the workforce during the time the bonus was 
claimed. That is, to get the full benefit of the tax refund, a woman needed to 
have been working and then stay out of the workplace entirely for five years.  
 The Coalition retained government in November 2001, and the 
incentive (by then widely dubbed a ‘Baby Bonus’) was formally implemented 
at the 2002-03 Budget, presented in May 2002. At this budget, a special 
annexure, the first Intergenerational Report (IGR) was also unveiled 
(Australian Government 2002). This pivotal report outlined the economic 
implications of projected demographic change until 2042, and has since been 
taken to represent the Australian Government’s first major 
acknowledgement of population ageing as a phenomenon requiring long-
term and strategic governmental management.  
 Among topics singled out for attention in the 2002-03 Budget and its 
complementary IGR was Australia’s declining birth rate. As Figure 1 shows, 
this focus was not without reason - by 2002, Australia’s TFR had been 
below the generational replacement rate of 2.1 births per woman for 26 
years – a full generation, and was thus unlikely to be simply an artefact of 
the way total fertility is measured.7 With substantially lower fertility rates 
in evidence across most of Australia’s counterpart countries, and a broad 
literature drawing attention to their societal implications, the Australian 
Government made its first overt move to prevent further decline with the 
introduction of the First Child Tax Refund. 
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Figure 1: Total fertility rate, Australia, 1921-2009  
 
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Births, various years 
 
 However, the Baby Bonus of that Budget was substantially different to 
the one which would eventually be unveiled at the 2004-05 Budget. In 2002 
the government was at pains to point out that the First Child Tax Refund 
was not a ‘Baby Bonus’ as such, merely part of the government’s 
commitment to help families address the work-family conundrum. Speaking 
on the topic shortly after the release of the IGR, Costello (2002) 
emphatically rejected calls for policy interventions that would raise fertility 
rates. He was explicit: 
A lot of attention has focussed recently on fertility rates as a way of 
rebuilding the working age population and decreasing the ratio of 
dependants to workers. Let me make some brief points: 
 
1. Over the last 30-40 years fertility rates have fallen in all 
advanced industrial societies and none of them has had 
success at a major turnaround.  
2. Boosting fertility rates actually reduces the proportion of 
the population of working age at least for a generation. It 
increases the dependant to worker ratio with a higher 
number of children. It has a negative effect for around 30 
years before you get the pay off.  
3. Boosting fertility rates may well reduce participation rates 
because mothers stay out of the workforce if only for a time. 
What this means is that in the near term there are two 
factors likely to reduce GDP before the pay-off after a 
generation.  
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4. If boosting the fertility rate is done by additional 
expenditures, it could have a negative effect if it required 
higher tax rates, or crowded out better alternative uses of 
public expenditures.  
 
Whilst the IGR has kicked off a great deal of interest in fertility rates, 
with maternity leave, divorce rates, abortion law changes, tax incentives 
to opt out of no-fault divorce all being raised, I would like to focus the 
debate on something that might actually have an achievable and practical 
effect. A positive development would be to encourage greater workforce 
participation by Australians in the 55-65 year old age bracket.  
 Costello also cited increased skilled immigration and increased 
productivity as other key solutions to ‘the problem’ of population ageing, 
but continually returned to the role of increased participation by older 
workers, which he stressed can be more readily influenced by governments 
and private sector employers than fertility rates: 
Higher participation among the over 55s will have a much more 
immediate and direct impact than rising fertility rates. More flexible 
working arrangements, training and re-training, and raising the 
preservation age for superannuation would all be positive moves to 
address this issue.  
 So there is little doubt that at this stage, tweaking fertility was being 
eschewed in favour of other solutions. As 2002 unfolded, the government 
continued to reject arguments that the First Child Tax Refund was a policy 
aimed at raising fertility, although there were occasions when John Howard 
himself referred to it as a Baby Bonus:  
I mean, we brought in a Baby Bonus which recognises that there's a huge 
loss of income when you have your first child and the Baby Bonus is 
designed to assist women who drop out of the workforce to have a child in 
that period when they lose that income. (Howard 2002) 
 The issue was seldom out of the media, as the policy was soon shown to 
be not only regressive in its effects, which gave greater returns to women 
who had been on higher incomes, but it also reinforced the model of the 
male breadwinner, in keeping mothers out of the workforce.  
 The issue of paid maternity leave for working women was similarly 
seldom out of the media during 2002. In April 2002 the Sex Discrimination 
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Commissioner Pru Goward released a discussion paper outlining several 
options and inviting submissions. In July, when referring to the battle many 
people have in balancing work and family responsibilities, the then Prime 
Minister John Howard made his now-famous ‘barbecue stopper’ comment. 
The issue, he said, is “the biggest ongoing social debate of our time…a 
barbeque stopper” (Howard 2002). Although he was referring to the 
balancing act itself being ”an issue of such importance that mention of it 
could halt the fun of a barbecue” (The Australian National Dictionary 
Centre), the comment was widely taken to refer to the possible introduction 
of paid maternity leave. The likely positive impact of such a move on 
Australia’s declining birth rate was also widely commented upon in the 
media, and was never outrightly ‘disowned’ by either Costello or Howard. 
Nevertheless, as history shows, the option [of paid maternity leave] was 
eventually soundly rejected by the government as imposing impossible costs 
on many businesses. There was no mention of the issue in the 2002-03 
budget, and it quietly slipped from centre stage.  
 But not so the issue of low fertility and its relationship with population 
ageing. Throughout the remainder of 2002 and into 2003, both media 
commentary on, and academic engagement with, the topic grew. Several 
media articles criticised the government’s stance in failing to develop a 
fertility-oriented population policy as short-sighted, directly urging the 
Treasurer to be more proactive in reversing low fertility (e.g. Kelly 2002: 
13). Others reported the opinions of many of Australia’s demographers, 
whose growing number of publications and pronouncements on the topic 
pointed out the economic and social implications of structural ageing, and 
the implications of delaying interventions that might arrest fertility decline 
and reduce the speed of future ageing. Demographic journals drew attention 
to the substantive and theoretical correlates of low fertility, which notably 
were both manifold and seemingly universal (across developed countries), 
indicating that local policy initiatives may do little to alter the trend. 
Editorials reiterated the main points8 letters to the Editor weighed in with 
both support for and - in some cases strong - resistance to the idea of 
supporting the nation’s families to have children. Surveys canvassed opinion 
on the desire for and the acceptance of children.9 The then Federal 
Treasurer of the Liberal party and chair of the Menzies Research Centre, 
Malcolm Turnbull, raged that the crisis was not population ageing, but low 
fertility per se, brought upon by the failing institution of marriage.10 Women 
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were continually reminded of the dangers of ‘leaving it too late’.11 There was 
seldom a week in which the issue did not appear in the media. 
 Behind the scenes the government also directly sought the advice of 
leading economic sociologists like Britain’s Katherine Hakim. In February 
2003 Hakim presented to the Department of Family and Community 
Services (2003: 22-23). Her tri-typology of women’s preferences as either 
home-centered, work-centred, or adaptive [to either of the other two 
positions, depending on the incentives] was later echoed in a number of 
statements by the Prime Minister and Treasurer. Importantly, Hakim 
pointed out that while these preferences should be accounted for in the 
development of any family and social policy, the best way of doing that was 
to develop policies that were ‘neutral’ and would appeal to all categories [of 
women], or be balanced to ensure that all categories would benefit in some 
way. At the same time the underlying message was that if the government 
could tweak the right buttons, at least some of Australia’s adaptive women 
(estimated to be as high as 90 percent)12 would plausibly respond with a 
baby, and presumably many of the home-centred women would do so as 
well. 
 Another key contributor to the debate during this period was leading 
Australian demographer Peter McDonald, whose work on low fertility has 
long pointed out the need for appropriate policy responses, and for those 
policies to be carefully coordinated. In a visionary paper published in 2003 
he challenged the government over its failure to make the substantial 
reforms implicitly promised in the Prime Minister’s ‘barbeque stopper’ 
comment, and carefully laid out both the principles of the needed reforms, 
and a proposal as to where the money to pay for them would come from 
(McDonald 2003a). In short he argued against the government’s present 
‘bolt on’ approach of constantly adding policies that have additional cost 
implications, proposing instead that the current ‘mish-mash’ of familial 
payments be scrapped and the money redirected at a broad agenda that 
centred around the age of a child and included measures such universal early 
childhood education. 
 Despite this advice and activity in general there was only minor 
mention of fertility and the family in the 2003-04 Budget (delivered on May 
13th 2003), its focus instead being tax cuts and the returning of the federal 
budget to surplus. Rottier (2005: 134-5) argues that this ‘oversight’ was 
possibly related to 2003 being a non-election year: her doctoral research 
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identified that in election years the federal budget is far more likely to 
contain a family angle than in non-election years. 
 Be that as it may it is now widely acknowledged that across 2002 and 
2003 the Prime Minister’s Department had its own ‘work and family’ task 
force engaging with the aforementioned literature and arguments, and 
considering alternatives to the ill-fated First Child Tax Refund/Baby 
Bonus.13 According to Summers (2004), among options that the task force 
investigated was a universal (non means-tested) Baby Bonus of between 
$3,000 and $5,000 on the birth of a child, a recommendation apparently 
adopted by cabinet at a meeting in late 2003 and foreshadowed by the Prime 
Minister some months earlier at the Liberal Party’s National Convention in 
Adelaide. 
 With deliberations over the possibility of a full-fledged Coalition Baby 
Bonus raging in the media throughout the remainder of 2003 and into the 
beginning of 2004, an election year, the then Labour Leader, Mark Latham, 
endeavoured to gazump the Prime Minister by announcing a non-means 
tested baby care payment of $3,000 spread across the first 14 weeks of a new 
baby’s life. From that point on the government also began to herald that its 
Baby Bonus (officially a Maternity Payment) would be implemented at the 
2004-05 Budget. Importantly this option would also resolve most of the 
government’s previous problems with the now-rejected paid maternity leave 
option, the idea of which had proven so unpopular with the business sector. 
In both directions the Baby Bonus was a vote-catcher. 
 In February 2004 the government released another key document 
related to population ageing titled Australia’s Demographic Challenges 
(Australian Government 2004a). By contrast with the Intergenerational 
Report, this document had much to say about Australia’s low fertility rate. 
However, its policy focus, like that of the IGR, remained on improving 
productivity and labour force participation as the key priorities in 
addressing population ageing: the three ‘choices’ presented at the end of the 
document were to raise taxes, reduce government expenditure, or increase 
the country’s debt; not to increase fertility. Indeed the document’s 
conclusions specifically re-stated Australia’s long-held position, that “the 
decision to have children is certainly an individual one. It is not (and should 
never be) the role of governments to tell citizens how many children they 
should have” (Australian Government 2004a: 19). 
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 Nevertheless, just a few months later the Australian government did 
exactly that: it specifically and unambiguously prescribed a desired family 
size of three. Perhaps what most surprised the populace was the nation’s 
leaders mischievously engaging in sexualized banter and responding to 
headlines such as ‘the erection budget’ (Howard 2004). Not only did the 
Treasurer take great delight in extending his call to duty to hundreds of 
assembled media to “go home and perform your patriotic duty tonight” 
(Costello 2004), but the following day the Prime Minister echoed it with 
“Come on, come on, your country needs you” (Farouque 2004) 14 
 From the 1st of June 2004 the Maternity Payment (the ‘new’ Baby 
Bonus) replaced its predecessor, the First Child Tax Refund, and provided a 
$3,000 grant for each new child, irrespective of the parity of the child or 
income of the parent/s, rising to $4,000 in 2006-07 and $5,000 in 2008-09.15  
 Over the following three years to mid 2007, the call to procreate was 
regularly repeated by government officials and the media, and the policy was 
ultimately referred to by then Treasurer Costello as Australia’s shift from 
‘populate or perish’ to ‘procreate and cherish’ (Costello 2006a, 2006b). 
Concerned that the message was perhaps being heeded a little too well by 
some teenagers, the only significant change to its original features under the 
Howard Government came in January 2007 in the form of a shift from the 
lump sum payment to a fortnightly payment, for mothers under the age of 
18 (Commonwealth of Australia 2006). 
 Despite having previously disagreed with various elements of the policy, 
the incoming Rudd Labour Government (November 2007) vowed to 
continue it.  By March 2008, Prime Minister Kevin Rudd stated that the 
policy appeared to be having an impact in terms of “slightly nudging up the 
birth rate” and so it would be “safe”’ under Labour.16 However, facing 
increasing calls from analysts that the cost of each ‘true’ extra birth was 
enormous and that there must be more efficient ways of delivering family 
payments (Guest 2007; see also Drago et al. 2009), the Rudd Government 
moved in its 2008 Budget to make it a means-tested payment from January 
1st 2009, along with moving all payments to a fortnightly basis.17 
 Aside from these minor changes, and continuing occasional comments 
by one or other government spokesperson that the Baby Bonus is not, 
strictly speaking, a pro-natal policy, there can be little argument that the 
intervention was, and remains, an explicit policy aimed at raising the birth 
rate. First, it is formalised as a pro-natal policy in the Government’s own 
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reporting on the matter (Table 1). After many decades of expressing no 
concern over the nation’s fertility rate and that no intervention was needed, 
the United Nations 2005 publication of ‘World Population Policies’ (which 
reports on around 196 countries across the globe) recorded that the 
Australian Government’s view was that fertility had fallen too low, and a 
policy was in place to raise it. Second, the policy’s objective (to fix the 
ageing demographic) and the means to achieve it (‘one for the father, one for 
the mother, one for the country’) were both clearly articulated. The Baby 
Bonus is also an indirect policy in that it targets the fertility decision-
making context as opposed to simply making it easier for families to 
combine work and family. 
Table 1: Australian Government view and policies on fertility and 
family planning, 1976 -2005  
 Fertility level Policy 
1976 Satisfactory No intervention 
1986 Satisfactory No intervention 
1996 Satisfactory No intervention 
2005 Too low Raise 
Source: United Nations (2005) 
 
 Australia is not alone in this endeavour: by 2007, 53 percent of 
developed countries had policies in place designed to raise their birth rates, 
up from 33 percent a decade ago (United Nations 2007).18  
Impacts of the Policy 
The burning question then: is the policy having an impact on Australia’s 
fertility? In 2001, notably before the implementation of either the first or 
second Baby Bonus, the total fertility rate had stopped falling, at 1.729. By 
the end of 2004 it had increased to 1.763, and to 1.978 by 2009 (Australian 
Bureau of Statistics 2009) - so the birth rate has clearly increased (refer to 
Figure 1). Decomposition analysis of the period covered by the Baby Bonus 
(2004-2008) indicates that almost 26 percent of the increase in birth 
numbers has been due to changing cohort size, leaving 74 percent explained 
by the increased birth rate and plausibly due to the intervention (Table 2).19 
It is certainly conceivable that the Government’s ‘two for you and one for 
us’ message has altered the context in which Australian fertility and family 
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formation decisions are being made, as per demography’s major theoretical 
explanations.20  
Table 2: Birth numbers and components of change due to cohort size 
and birth rate, 2004 and 2008  
 Births Component due to cohort size 
Component due to 
birth rate 
Age 2004 2008 Difference 2004-08 N % N % 
15 362 434 72 16 22.2 56 77.8 
16 881 1030 149 50 33.6 99 66.4 
17 1949 2081 132 133 100.8 0 -0.8 
18 3174 3493 319 174 54.5 145 45.5 
19 4514 5283 769 188 24.4 581 75.6 
20 5363 6190 827 248 30.0 579 70.0 
21 6342 7207 865 295 34.1 570 65.9 
22 7133 8639 1506 620 41.2 886 58.8 
23 8291 9498 1207 977 80.9 230 19.1 
24 9054 11163 2109 1358 64.4 751 35.6 
25 10693 12652 1959 1712 87.4 247 12.6 
26 12212 14537 2325 1689 72.6 636 27.4 
27 13687 15898 2211 1538 69.6 673 30.4 
28 15315 17363 2048 1183 57.8 865 42.2 
29 17009 18624 1615 626 38.8 989 61.2 
30 17813 19051 1238 -132 -10.7 1370 110.7 
31 18567 19877 1310 -735 -56.1 2045 156.1 
32 18639 19459 820 -1441 -175.7 2261 275.7 
33 17468 18507 1039 -1355 -130.4 2394 230.4 
34 15024 17302 2278 91 4.0 2187 96.0 
35 12986 16397 3411 601 17.6 2810 82.4 
36 10281 14106 3825 1303 34.1 2522 65.9 
37 7961 11354 3393 1236 36.4 2157 63.6 
38 6256 8670 2414 500 20.7 1914 79.3 
39 4695 6505 1810 231 12.8 1579 87.2 
40 3406 4460 1054 -65 -6.2 1119 106.2 
41 2133 2976 843 -99 -11.7 942 111.7 
42 1441 1809 368 -54 -14.7 422 114.7 
43 831 1008 177 -21 -11.9 198 111.9 
44 399 521 122 12 9.8 110 90.2 
45 196 240 44 12 27.3 32 72.7 
46 89 127 38 7 18.4 31 81.6 
47 29 47 18 3 16.7 15 83.3 
48 14 46 32 1 3.1 31 96.9 
49 42 60 18 3 16.7 15 83.3 
Total  254,247 296,615 42368 10,905 25.7 31,463 74.3 
 
Source: Calculated from Australian Bureau of Statistics (2009) Births, Australia 2008, cat no 
33010DO010_2008 and ERP by age and sex.  
Note: Component due to cohort size is calculated by applying age-specific fertility rates for 
2004 to population numbers for 2008(=expected births at 2004 rates) and subtracting 
the result from observed births. Component due to birth rate = the balance (observed 
minus expected).  
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 Rational and risk-averse actors alike may be engaging with the 
perception that more support for the family is on offer; post-materialists 
may be broadening their options to include a/nother child, and those who 
have been struggling with gender inequities between the workplace and the 
domestic world may be finding that these have decreased. Hakim’s ‘adaptive’ 
and ‘home centred’ mothers may have responded to the call. However, 
fertility rates have also recently risen in many other countries, notably 
Europe (Myrskyla, Kohler and Billari 2009), generating enthusiastic claims 
that the era of low-low fertility is over.  
 On the one hand, this increase could reflect the shift to a pro-natal 
policy environment in those countries, but, on the other, it could mean that 
the changes in Australia may simply be part of a broader movement, having 
very little to do with the Baby Bonus per se. At this point in time we must 
simply watch and wait. Certainly there is no room for complacency, with 
some analysts cautioning that the ‘reversal of low fertility’ may be simply an 
artifactual tempo effect, caused by a return to slightly earlier childbearing 
and/or to the end of delayed and recuperated childbearing. There has been 
no reversal in any of the major substantive correlates of low fertility, such as 
increased levels of female tertiary education and labour force participation – 
which are still increasing.  
 Finally, it is worth reflecting on Peter Costello’s original concerns back 
at the 2002-2003 Budget when he argued that “boosting fertility rates 
actually … increases the dependant to worker ratio with a higher number of 
children. It has a negative effect for around 30 years before you get the pay 
off”. Australia’s 2009 age structure clearly shows this impact (Figure 2), 
with a small skirt at ages 0-4 years, and it must be remembered that these 
young people will be arriving at school and working their way through the 
school system at exactly the same point as the baby boomers begin to retire 
en masse, from 2012.  It is to be hoped that the enthusiasm which surround 
their collective birth will continue to support them as they grow up.  
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Figure 2: Australian population age/sex structure, 2009  
 
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics Cat no 3201.0 
 
Summary and Conclusion 
Despite wholeheartedly rejecting the idea of a full-fledged Baby Bonus at 
the 2002-03 Budget, the then Howard Government implemented exactly 
that just two years later, at the 2004-05 Budget. The shift to an explicit but 
indirect pro-natal policy not only represents an abrupt disjuncture with the 
past, but appears to have been based on genuine concerns by the 
Government about structural population ageing, undoubtedly driven by the 
slowly dawning reality of the economic implications of the phenomenon. Its 
continuation by the Rudd Government adds to its substance. However this 
is not the same as saying that the Baby Bonus is in any way the integrated 
and astute reforms espoused by McDonald in 2003a (see his comments in 
McDonald 2005 and 2006) – it remains an ad hoc policy with many 
contradictions in other non-aligned policies, which together render any 
fertility-raising impacts vulnerable. 
 Australia’s fertility rate has (at this point) stopped falling, and has risen 
significantly, allowing the previous Howard Government - and more 
guardedly the present Rudd Government - to attribute at least some of the 
rise to the Baby Bonus. However, fertility was actually rising sometime 
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before the policy was implemented, and moreover is also presently rising 
across many European countries. This could mean that Australia is part of a 
broader movement, and may have nothing at all to do with the Baby Bonus. 
But it may also simply reflect the way fertility is measured, via an index 
which cannot account for – among other factors - changes in the timing of 
childbirth.21 Changing cohort size and the possibility of echo effects, for 
example as large cohorts reach their peak reproductive years, can be more 
readily accounted for, and in Australia’s case are certainly making a 
contribution – accounting for one quarter of the increase in births since 
2004. Perhaps less well understood is the likely impact on total birth 
numbers as these larger cohorts are replaced by smaller ones, even if the 
birth rate per woman remains high. 
 Lastly, Peter Costello’s original concerns that boosting fertility rates 
increases the dependency ratio, should not be overlooked. While the 
Government gaze around the developed world is firmly fixed on current 
birth rates, the births of the 1940s and ‘50s are quietly approaching 
retirement; if it has been successful, it was perhaps not the best time of times 
to introduce a pro-natal policy. 
Notes 
1 Among these are: House of Representatives (1992); Clare 1994; Borowski and 
Hugo 1996; Young (1999); Jackson (1999, 2001); Barnes (2001); Australian 
Bureau of Statistics (2001), and the work of Peter McDonald, Rebecca Kippen, 
Graeme Hugo, Donald Rowland, and Robert Birrell passim. 
2 Australia’s official submission to the 1994 Cairo conference on population and 
development, stated that ‘Australia does not have an explicit or formal 
population policy directly aimed at influencing the level of the population … 
the government decided that a formal population policy (particularly one which 
would specify population targets) would not be appropriate for Australia, given 
its low levels of fertility and diversity of community views as to the character 
and objectives of such a policy.’ (National Committee 1994 cited in Cocks 1998: 
23).  
3 Notably another significant report was prepared for the government while 
Bishop was Minister for Aged Care. This report by Access Economics (2001) 
details the spending patterns of older Australians and concludes that population 
ageing would deliver as many positives and opportunities as negatives. The 
report does not contain the term ‘fertility’ but uses the term ‘birth rate’ on five 
occasions. Four of these occur together (pp. 34-35) in the context of an 
argument that increasing the birth rate would not begin to have a useful impact 
for at least 16 years (when the additional births would translate into additional 
labour supply). 
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4 Now known as the Department of Health and Aged Care 
5 The issue of ‘strengthening families’ and low fertility soon became linked in 
government discourse. Among others, Rottier (2005: 144-5 and Chapter 9) 
draws attention to the implicit racism in the combination, which on the one 
hand rejects would-be migrants from Asian countries, and on the other, calls on 
Australian families to ‘grow their own’. See also Manne (2001: 21) on a similar 
argument for Scandinavia. 
6 The policy contained elitist elements, in that a minimum annual refund was set 
at $500, and a maximum at $2,500, being 20 percent of the tax paid on an 
annual salary of $52,666. Higher income mothers thus received a substantially 
greater bonus. 
7 The Total Fertility Rate (TFR) is a synthetic measure which uses the sum of 
current age-specific birth rates in any year as a proxy for the number of 
children a woman aged 15-49 in that year will have across her life time. It is 
greatly affected by changes in the age at childbearing. If a large proportion of 
women delay having children, the TFR will be depressed; if childbearing is 
bought forward, the TFR will rise. 
8 For example, ‘Maternity leave debate hots up’, The Sydney Morning Herald 
18/7/02, p.10; ‘It still takes two, baby’, The Age 8/1/03, p10; ‘Birthrate not just 
an issue of motherhood’, The Australian 8/1/03, p 10. 
9 The 2003 Australian Survey of Social Attitudes (AuSSA) run by the ACSPRI 
Centre for Social Research sampled 4,270 people aged 18 years and over. 
Among the questions was the statement ‘a life without children is not fully 
complete’ (agree/disagree). 
10 ‘The crisis is fertility, not ageing’, The Age, 16/7/02, p.11. ‘Turnbull is now a 
government MP with much to say about Australia’s fertility, including that low 
fertility countries ‘are not ageing, they are dying’ (Totaro 2005). 
11 Later, in 2005, McDonald argued that the ‘debate we have been having about 
waiting too long when you want to have children has had an effect [on the 
fertility rate]’ (see Legge 2005: 19 and Marriner and Totaro 2005; also 
McDonald 2005: 5). 
12 Data from the HILDA (Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia) 
and Women’s Health Australia presented at the Australian Institute of Family 
Studies (AIFS) conference (Department of Family and Community Services 
2003: 23). 
13 An interesting comparison with the eventual policy is Peter McDonald’s 
(2003a) proposal for a flat $6,500 payment to families with babies and toddlers, 
reducing to $2,500 per year plus 20 hours per week free childcare/education for 
children aged 3 to 4 years. McDonald’s proposal also included related budget 
costings, and called on the government to scrap its multitude of family tax and 
welfare benefits and to divert the funds as suggested, arguing that it would cost 
no more than the government was already paying. 
14 It takes little effort to locate the antecedents of these exhortations. In the 1940s 
Winston Churchill similarly called on Britons to have four children: ‘one for 
mother, one for father, one for accidents and one for increase’ (Legge 2005: 19). 
More recently the Swedish government had Bjorn Borg urge his fellow Swedes 
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to ‘fuck for the future’ (Ananova 2001; Manne 2001: 6). In 1995 the Turkish 
Prime Minister argued for at least four children, and his successor reiterated his 
words, claiming ‘Allah wants it’. (Longman 2004: 9). 
15 The intervention was accompanied by an increase in all levels of Family Tax 
Benefit (an intervention from 2000 associated with the introduction of the 
GST), bringing the base payment up to $1,695 per year inclusive of a new, 
immediate lump-sum payment of $600, and other elements of the package such 
as an additional 30,000 outside-school-hours childcare places and 1,500 family 
day care places (O’Neill 2004: 9 in Rottier 2005: 150). 
16 ‘Baby Bonus will stay: Rudd’. Radio interview with Fairfax Radio, March 14th 
2008 http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2008/03/14/2189859.htm  
17 Interview of Jenny Macklin by Hilary Harper (31/12/2008) ‘Baby Bonus- 
Transcript’ 
http://www.jennymacklin.fahcsia.gov.au/internet/jennymacklin.nsf/content/b
aby_bonus_02jan09.htm;  
http://www.smh.com.au/news/national/rudd-to-end-baby-bonus-for-
rich/2008/05/02/1209235155734.html 
18 In some cases, non fertility oriented policies can also have this effect – see 
Callister and Galtry 2009 for a comparison of New Zealand’s Parental Leave 
policy with Australia’s Baby Bonus. 
19 Certainly, in July 2004, as many as 1,000 births were due to an ‘introduction 
effect’, and a smaller number at each subsequent anniversary coinciding with 
the payment increase – see Gans and Leigh 2008. 
20  See McDonald 2000 for elaboration of these theoretical explanations for low 
fertility. Another is the ‘low fertility trap’ proposed by Wolfgang Lutz, which 
generally holds that people who have grown up in an era of low fertility will 
not seek to have large families themselves. 
21 A decline in age at childbearing typically increases the total fertility rate 
(because it brings births forward); an increase (in childbearing age) decreases it 
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